Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Honourable Dr I S G Mudenge
OPENING STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HONOURABLE DR I. S. G.. MUDENGE
DURING THE OFFICIAL ZIMBABWE-EU CONSULTATIONS
The Presidents of the ACP Council and the European
Union
Honourable Ministers;
Representatives of the EU Commissions
Excellencies
Distinguished Colleagues;
Ladies and Gentlemen;
It is an honour for me to share this platform
with you, Honourable Presidents, as we formally
launch the first-ever Zimbabwe-EU dialogue. Allow
me on this occasion to express publicly my best
wishes for the Spanish Presidency of the EU. Your
country has been wise for so many centuries and
can therefore certainly eminently handle for the
next six months, the busy schedule ahead of you
with sagacity and perspicacity. In the 17th century
Zimbabwe was briefly a Spanish colony. To the
President of the, ACP I say thank you for being
there. Your country Nigeria has played a pivotal
role in searching for a solution to the bilateral
question of Zimbabwe- UK relations.
Excellencies,
It will be recalled that Zimbabwe signalled its
readiness, as early as June last year, to launch
the Zimbabwe-EU dialogue under Article 8, after
the EU Troika in Harare and our own Core Dialogue
Group of officials had elaborated a framework
for dialogue on that platform. After successive
EU presidencies had kept us on a long and unexplained
standby, we were utterly dismayed at the sudden
decision by the EU's General Affairs Council to
move the Zimbabwe-EU dialogue to the Article 96
procedure. I personally conveyed through diplomatic
channels and in writing to the previous two EU
presidencies Zimbabwe's readiness to commence
dialogue since June 2001 but for still quite inexplicable
reasons my requests for the commencement of dialogue
under Article 8 were never taken up. The reply
I eventually got was to be informed that the EU
General Council had decided to move away from
Article 8 to Article 96 procedures. Why this unilateral
action was taken still baffles us. To us this
is a poor example of the spirit of partnership.
However our disappointment notwithstanding, Zimbabwe
took a prompt decision to accept dialogue under
Article 96, on the understanding that:
a) It is a dialogue, not a monologue or a diatribe;
b) Both sides are committed to a positive outcome,
as emphasized in Article 8, Article 96 and the
intent and spirit of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement
as a whole;
c) A dialogue that goes to the heart of the nature
of the partnership between 15 EU countries and
71 ACP countries needs to have the support, involvement
and intervention of as representative a sample
of the ACP countries as possible, and its outcome
must be wholly acceptable to the ACP and the EU;
d) The dialogue shall address root causes of
problems experienced in Zimbabwe, and shall not
exclude consideration, examination and joint decision
on actions by member countries of the EU that
have a bearing on the resolution of those problems;
e) Nothing in the dialogue should subvert progress
being made in the African initiatives launched
by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and
in which a member of the EU is an integral and
critical participant as well as the SADC initiative.
During preparations for dialogue under Article
8, we made it abundantly clear, and it was understood
by the EU troika in Harare, as has been affirmed
under the Abuja process that the concerns raised
by the EU converged on the unresolved and central
issue of land. To the extent that it has been
possible to give the people of Zimbabwe a new
hope on this fundamental matter, based on the
Abuja Conclusions, tensions have markedly decreased,
and a more conducive atmosphere for the orderly
implementation of government programmes has been
promoted. Police evidence indicates that there
have been no fresh farm occupations since Abuja,
and SADC Ministers and representatives of other
observers have acknowledged and welcomed the steps
taken by Government to facilitate the implementation
of the Abuja Conclusions and the land reform programme
in general.
However, I must point out that discouragement
of the people in the form of statements from certain
EU capitals, that seem to suggest a hesitant approach
on the part of countries that made definite commitments
at Abuja, is most unhelpful, and this is an area
where Zimbabwe seeks the help and cooperation
of its EU partners.
Confidence-building measures that appear one-sided
to our people subvert the reality of partnership.
While actions taken by the Government of Zimbabwe
to implement Abuja are a matter of record, there
is grave concern that the strategy of the UK,
an EU member, is to make promises of assistance,
then mobilize international opinion through its
unfair access to global media outreach and the
empathy of some of its North Atlantic friends
to oppose such assistance in practice. This suspicion
of lack of commitment is made more intense by
repeated references that link the UK and "the
international community" in hostile propaganda
and actions against Zimbabwe, as this approach
appears to be designed to distance the UK, an
EU member, from its historical obligations, which
are primarily bilateral in nature.
The UK has used its considerable holdings and
or control of the media in Southern Africa and
the UK to blackout truthful information about
the significant, positive strides made by Zimbabwe
in the very same areas identified by the EU as
areas of concern. For our partnership, an important
question to resolve is: in the ACP-EU Partnership,
is good behaviour required also of EU countries
or only of the ACP countries? It is time to answer
that question for the sake of the Partnership.
The combination of the assault on Zimbabwe through
media channels to which Zimbabwe is no match,
with a direct assault on its sovereignty and on
its democratic development by certain members
of the EU, is a tragic illustration of the kind
of hypocrisy that should find no comfort in such
a partnership as ours. Some members of the EU
have seriously undermined this partnership by
getting actively involved in the politics of Zimbabwe,
sponsoring and campaigning in favour of opposition
movements and seeking the ouster, by all means,
of the democratically elected government. The
informal sanctions imposed on us by EU member
countries concurrently with EU invitations to
us to come and dialogue represent the nadir of
cynicism. It is time that we dealt frontally and
honestly with such subversive hypocrisy, otherwise,
what principle can be safe?
The EU and Zimbabwe, in the context of the Cotonou
Agreement, are meant to be closer and more responsible
in the conduct of their relations than less committed
others might be, whose reflex is to cut their
losses and run at the slightest difficulty or
incident. Our relations and partnership place
obligations on us that are relational, programmatic
and practical.
Firstly, these obligations are relational because
relationships are the only sound basis for interaction.
Where there is no relationship, there is no interaction.
Where the relationship is a bad and unsustainable
one, you hear talk of strictures and sanctions.
Our partnership should not be like that. I must
recall that the EU Troika in Harare and the Core
Dialogue Group on the Zimbabwean side had worked
hard and presented us, not with two contending
pieces of paper or reports, but with a joint agenda
that was based on our shared principles and a
stubborn commitment to a process whose only acceptable
outcome is jointly-crafted solutions. I move,
Honourable Presidents, that we proceed in that
same spirit, the change of platform notwithstanding.
Secondly, these obligations are programmatic
in that our partnership agreement expresses itself
in economic development co-operation programmes
that are result-bound. As we launch this comprehensive
dialogue, we must bear in mind that it is not
only about problems, but also about where the
opportunities are and where we can show our resolve
to work together and produce positive results.
The outcome of our dialogue should be that of
partners emerging with a programme of closer co-operation
that encompasses areas of opportunity as well
as those of challenge.
Thirdly, the relationship between the ACP and
the EU has always been distinguished by the fact
that it is a practical relationship that expressed
itself through access - through trade that is
strengthened by contractual arrangements and through
a co-ordinated posture as we face threats from
developments such as globalisation. It is about
access to each other's aspirations, interpretations
and thought processes, and perforce demands sensitivity
and patient listening skills. Out of this dialogue
we expect Zimbabwe and the EU to evolve a good
example of the triumph of reason over pettiness
through a pragmatic engagement with issues and
solutions, yielding a united vision of the way
forward. I am certain that you will agree with
me that our united constituency will not tolerate
it if we emerged from this dialogue in any other
way. They would rather we stayed cloistered in
the discussion room until we found full understanding
and achieved full accommodation. Our colleagues
in the ACP, the OAU and SADC have certainly driven
this point home to us in the most emphatic terms.
There are some things that must be excluded at
the outset, and we are glad that the spirit of
dialogue and partnership as we understand it excludes
such things. Partnership is not about lecturing
or talking down to, demanding obeisance or severing
lifelines - that is supercilious vindictiveness.
It is not about grovelling, begging and kow-towing,
for that would be a selling out of the dignity
of entire continents. It is not a partnership
between "a horse and a rider" as one
Prime Minister of the then Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland once defined partnership between
whites and blacks. No, Dear Colleagues, the story
we would rather tell the world is that the partnership
between Zimbabwe and the EU is not doomed; it
is too strong and too valuable to be destroyed
by the occurrence of a series of incidents blown
out of proportion by a sponsored media. Perhaps
it will not be presumptuous to assume that you
share that same conviction.
Yes, there are issues, and this is a fact of
logic, for without them there would be no need
for a dialogue. We must not shrink from engaging
historical questions of cause and effect or from
challenging ourselves with creative proposals
on how this partnership can be put to work to
remove contradictions and suspicions, and to redirect
energies to delivering land to the land-starved
people of Zimbabwe, and to promoting their well-being
and prosperity in all spheres. There may be questions
on some of these topics, and for some of those
questions the answers are within easy reach. Where
the complexity is somewhat more profound, we must
rise to the challenge of finding the whys and
wherefores, drawing on our fund of goodwill to
analyse without rancour the underlying causes
from which the rash of symptoms erupts.
Early in the dialogue, we must tackle the question
of the colonial albatross that has poisoned ties
between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom, a member
of this partnership. We are of the firm conviction
that the poison can be rid of for good, as our
partnership is vested with the virtue to perform
this beneficent exorcism. The only demon that
can foil the power of our partnership to do just
that, and to do it quickly, is a lack of will.
Rest assured, Dear Colleagues, of Zimbabwe's willingness
to go deep into the heart of the matter in a spirit
of constructive partnership, with a view to helping
the facts of history and the aspirations of the
future Zimbabwe generations to guide us all in
delivering durable and enduring solutions. I hope
that these sentiments find resonance in your own
heart.
I am fully confident that, once we have listened
to each other's concerns and given ear to each
other's answers, we can walk out of here and tell
the world that we have eliminated concerns over
such areas as the rule of law, a concern that
has acquired a poignancy over the last two years
because of efforts to effectively address the
pressing question of historical injustices in
the distribution of land among the people of Zimbabwe.
You can guess already that we shall seek special
help from you in this area, particularly as we
perceive a need for the removal of the contradiction
of an EU which articulates the sum of the views
of its member states, and in the same breath disavows
all responsibility for helping resolve problems
arising from the policy posture of one of those
member states. This would be analogous to the
ACP looking passively on as Zimbabwe sets unacceptable
precedents for it in its dialogue with the EU-
a prospect that is obviously unthinkable.
A little history here cannot hurt. As we all
know, the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was
fired by the people's deep desire to regain possession
of land expropriated under colonial rule. Given
that it ranked highest among the grievances that
motivated indigenous people to launch and wage
the liberation struggle, the land question was
inevitably central to independence negotiations
at Lancaster House in 1979. The talks almost broke
down over the issue, and were deadlocked for a
time. The impasse was only broken when both the
British and American governments agreed to contribute
to and mobilize financial support for a comprehensive
land reform programme in independent Zimbabwe.
Yet successive British governments have sought
to derail the land reform programme and have courted
international sympathy for their objectives by
publicly demonising President Mugabe and his government.
Britain has used its membership of the EU to gain
sympathy for white farmers in Zimbabwe and to
try to evade its colonial responsibilities. The
worries that other members of the EU have articulated,
genuine as they might be, stem directly from the
actions and inactions of the UK. To evade its
responsibilities the UK has orchestrated an anti
Mugabe and Zimbabwe campaign beginning with a
number of conferences which advocated violent
mischief against the democratically elected President
of Zimbabwe and his democratically elected Government.
It cannot be responsibly proposed by either of
us that we gloss over this important matter and
pretend to be having a meaningful dialogue. The
minimum we must achieve on this occasion is to
assign the highest priority to this pivotal matter
on the agenda of the dialogue, and to require
that substantive recommendations be made on how
to resolve it within an urgent and specific time
frame.
Before 1997 Zimbabwe was being touted as one
of the emerging "African lions" in the
British press with one of the best performing
emerging stock exchanges. But after 1997 Zimbabwe
was presented as a hopeless case. Why this change
one may ask. What happened to bring this about?
Two things, in fact happened to produce the change.
First Zimbabwe took steps to resolve the land
question once and for all. Secondly, Zimbabwe
took the principled decision to join other SADC
allies in defending the sovereignty of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, at the request of that
SADC country's legitimate Government. We only
resorted to this action after the new Labour Government
had reneged on the Lancaster House obligation
to assist us with land reform. To quote the exact
words of the then newly appointed Secretary of
State Ms Clare Short:
"I should make it clear that we do not
accept that Britain has a special responsibility
to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe.
We are a new Government from diverse backgrounds
without links to former colonial Interests. My
own origins are Irish and as you know we were
colonised not colonisers".
With that letter the present UK/Zimbabwe impasse
was born.
1997 was the watershed year for the British approach
to Zimbabwe, and for its diplomatic thrust to
affect how others thought about, and acted on,
Zimbabwe. Our transgression that year was to legally
compulsorily acquire nearly 1 500 farms owned
by white Zimbabweans for the resettlement of landless
peasants. We proceeded to designate the 1 500
farms for acquisition on that basis, and all hell
broke loose.
Considering the influential interests affected
by the decision to empower the Black people of
Zimbabwe, British reaction was inevitable. It
must not be forgotten that the dispossession of
the African during colonial times empowered the
colonizers, and any reversal of that disproportionate
empowerment was bound to meet with resistance,
notably from the metropolitan capital. After all,
in the case of Zimbabwe, the land ownership register
revealed that some members of the British House
of Lords, and other individuals connected in some
way to the British Establishment owned large tracts
of land as absentee landlords. This is in addition
to the nearly 4 100 white farmers, mainly of British
extraction who owned nearly 70% of the best arable
land in my country.
The British moved fast to try to block our initiative
and the best minds were assigned to come up with
an effective strategy to deal with the developments
in Zimbabwe. It is, of course, not always clear
how such schemes are set in motion, but what became
abundantly clear at an early stage was that someone
had decided that Zimbabwe should be dealt with
ruthlessly and on every conceivable front, and
that with great dispatch. Yes, there should be
tarring and feathering, but the objective must
be more practical and radical in character: President
Mugabe and his Government must be removed, by
hook or by crook and so it would appear preferably
by crook!
First the EU was prevailed upon to commission
a study on Zimbabwe. Such a report was duly prepared
and presented to the EU's Africa Working Group
for its use in making recommendations on Zimbabwe.
Vagueness was not one of the weaknesses of that
report. Its analysis and prognosis were forthright:
for things to go "right" in Zimbabwe,
President Mugabe must go. This could be done through
civil society, notably the trade union movement
or NGOs, through organised urban uprisings, the
implied possibility of discontentment in the armed
forces, the exploitation of perceived rifts in
the ruling Party, ZANU-PF, and the transformation
of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions into
a political party. The prognosis for President
Mugabe was that he would not last till the scheduled
Presidential elections set for 2002. The EU report
isolated land reform and Zimbabwe's presence in
the DRC for special mention as causes of problems.
We were shocked by the EU report when it came
out. But that was only a beginning, worse was
still to come.
At Chatham House, the EU Report's recommendations
were carried forward with the same objective,
namely the removal of President Mugabe and his
Government. How this could be done was elaborated
upon during a meeting of the Royal Institute of
International Affairs on 24 January, 1999, at
which the theme was "Zimbabwe-Time for Mugabe
to Go?", Richard Dowden of The Economist
guided the meeting through options in the enterprise
of removing President Mugabe from power:
1) by military coup, though that might be at
odds with democracy;
2) by election, though he did not hold out much
hope for the opposition;
3) through upheavals in the streets; and
4) through manoeuvres within the Ruling Party,
ZANU-PF.
President Mugabe's sins were defined as "confiscating"
white-held land and sending troops to the DRC.
The picture was clearer now and the strategies
were set out.
A seminar under the title "Zimbabwe at the
Crossroads" was held in the US State Department
on 23 March, 1999 at which the strategy for dealing
with the "Zimbabwe crisis" was further
elaborated. Messrs Chester Crocker and Robert
Rotberg were incisive in their analysis, and authoritative
and robust in their prescriptions. What must be
done, they argued, is to work through NGOs, find
ways to divide the Shonas and the Ndebeles, probe
the ruling party for weak spots with a view to
subverting it, and generally make Zimbabwe ungovernable.
Induced discontent and dissent should be carefully
stoked and nurtured to achieve the desired end.
Civil society must be "strengthened"
for the task, and opposition parties induced to
merge. Civil unrest should be assisted in and
outside major cities to render Zimbabwe ungovernable,
and covert assistance should be given to elements
within the ruling party to promote fragmentation.
The seminar-leaders at the State Department emphasized
Zimbabwe's presence in the DRC as a problematic
issue.
It is difficult to fault the synchronisation
of thought and action in this endeavour. On the
28th of November, 1998, The Economist suggestively
played with various scenarios:
There could, for instance, be developments along
Indonesian lines. The economic situation is likely
to worsen in 1999 and dissatisfaction will grow.
The trade unions, which directly challenge the
government, might call a five-day strike to demand
early elections. If the government banned the
unions and arrested their leader, Morgan Tsvangirai,
furious crowds would take to the streets. After
bloodshed, the government might fall.
Or there could be a palace coup against Mr Mugabe
one
faction could conceivably decide to seize power.
Perhaps Britain and others of the North Atlantic
ought to be congratulated for achieving such perfect
congruency of thought with their media. But to
congratulate them on that alone would not do them
justice. On matters that touch the interests of
kith and kin, to say nothing of holders of high
office, the British in particular think, speak
and act as one. A look at the patronage of the
Zimbabwe Democracy Trust, which was formed in
April 2000 for the purpose of fuelling dissent
in Zimbabwe, is dramatically illustrative of the
way in which the worry over the restoration of
land to its rightful, indigenous owners by having
whites of British descent share it with the indigenous
majority transcends ideological and other differences:
Former Secretaries of State, Lord Howe, Lord Hurd,
Lord Carrington, and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, joined
Lords Steel of Aikwood, Taylor of Warwick, Lady
Soames and Sir John Collins to form the Zimbabwe
Democracy Trust to campaign against Zimbabwe on
the international stage. The trans-Atlantic flavour
is brought to this curious brew by Chester Crocker
of the "Constructive Engagement" fame.
It is not for me to say whether he is hoping for
a peerage. Go to the internet to check on the
regular virulently anti Zimbabwe propaganda churned
out by this cabal
This unity of purpose is also revealed in the
programmes of the Westminster Foundation to destabilise
Zimbabwe through the direct funding of the opposition.
This foundation is funded 95% by the British Government.
Prime Minister Tony Blair as well as the leaders
of the other major British political Parties are
its patrons. I submit for the record a report
of the funding of the Movement for Democratic
Change in Zimbabwe by the British Labour Party,
Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats from
the funds of the Westminister Foundation. All
the British major Parties are sponsoring and funding
the main opposition party in Zimbabwe. Is this
fair or promotive of democracy in Zimbabwe - No
it is not. It is unacceptable interference in
our internal affairs nay it is a recolonization
of Zimbabwe. We reject it and we condemn it.
The full arsenal must, of course, be unleashed.
When it comes to Zimbabwe, the Conservatives,
Labour and the Liberals become one, because the
steps taken by Zimbabwe to address the injustices
created by British colonialism hurt the British
establishment as a whole. An intervention by a
member of the House of Commons during a recent
debate is revealing in this regard:
"We cannot abandon the white farmers because
we sent them there
."
The unfair media advantage I mentioned earlier
has been used to maximum advantage by those who
would like to see Zimbabwe fail. Again, whether
it be the Financial Times, The Economist or the
so-called "private" newspapers in South
Africa or Zimbabwe, the editorial thrust is driven
by a powerful coalition of shareholders and official
interests in the United Kingdom. Hence stories
about incidences in Zimbabwe are orchestrated
as a catastrophe, and the reader is left uninformed
of the reality being described. More people may
die in elections in South Africa or elsewhere.
Indeed the British Deputy Prime Minister may shut
down an over-self expressive voter with his fist
during an election. All this is reported as being
quite normal. But let it happen in Zimbabwe, ah,
rule of law has broken down!
Clearly, the problem with Zimbabwe's presence
in the DRC is not the principle of it. If principles
were the issue, the canons would be aimed at Uganda
and Rwanda, who are the aggressors. We went by
invitation, and in the company of two other SADC
countries. No, it is clearly not about any principle.
The problem is that our intervention frustrated
powerful interests, for which the scenario that
might have prevailed had we not intervened would
have been conducive to their designs.
Given this knowledge, which I am certain we all
know and must admit if we are honest, why are
we here? Why are we beating about the bush and
pursuing obvious red herrings? The whole world
knows that Zimbabwe is the second longest-running
stable multi-party democracy in Africa, and that
since our independence in 1980, five elections
have been held freely and fairly and on schedule.
Why are aspersions cast on Zimbabwe's impeccable
record, all of a sudden? Of course, I know, and
you know, that the issue of elections in Zimbabwe
cannot legitimately be placed on the agenda of
our dialogue, as it does not arise, but I am simply
inviting you to reflect on the irony, which must
give us pause.
We come to Brussels at a time when there is real
hope that Zimbabwe's commitment to resolving those
problems that are in its power to resolve is yielding
dividends. Our Land Resettlement Programme under
the A1 settlement scheme is more or less completed,
and we have embarked in earnest upon the commercially-driven
A2 scheme. These programmes are being implemented
in accordance with the laws and Constitution of
Zimbabwe. Indeed, the Supreme Court has confirmed
the consonance of the Programme with our Constitution,
and with our laws. I believe this meeting will
note this for the record, and formally retire
a concern often expressed on the subject.
We come at a time when there is reason for friends
to celebrate with us the removal of contradictions
between laws and the interests of society. Our
Parliament is to be commended for its untiring
efforts to craft laws that every sensible citizen
would be proud to be guided by, and which our
judiciary can adjudicate without having to go
to confession immediately afterwards.
The SADC Ministerial Task Force on Zimbabwe was
with us recently, and expressed its satisfaction
with the significant reduction of tensions and
violent incidents in the country. They encouraged
us to continue with the efforts we are making
to maintain the atmosphere of calm prevailing
in the country. I submit a report drawn up by
the Commissioner of Police to give a picture of
the true situation in Zimbabwe today.
No, we are not in Utopia-not yet anyway. It would
be unrealistic to expect that extreme elements
in our society would take things lying down. It
may take more time and persuasion to convince
some former owners of multiple farms that it is
in everyone's best interests to allow production
to go forward under the new settlement pattern,
rather than to stir their workers into attacking
settlers and provoking retaliatory violence. It
may take even longer to convince some white Zimbabwean
commercial farmers that the British High Commission
is not the complaints department of the Government
of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The internet still
buzzes with concocted stories created in cyberspace
by those who are nostalgic for the good old days
of racial discrimination and UDI. And EU newspapers
still pick these stories up, add wind to them,
and fly the balloon across the globe. No, we are
not yet in Utopia.
Well, we are here, and we must dialogue. Since
this is largely uncharted territory that we are
about to enter, we have taken appropriate steps
to ensure that the ACP, the African region and
the Southern African sub-region are fully associated
with what we are doing to demonstrate to the world
that the partnership they subscribe to is a partnership
that works. This is of course both a logical and
a moral imperative as it would be wrong to conduct
a consultation that may set a precedent for future
such dialogues without involving our fellow members
of the ACP group.
We must, of course, engage the question of how
the progress of the consultations will be assessed.
At first, we were alarmed, disheartened and quite
frankly offended when it seemed from the speculations
of some, including Zimbabwe's private press, that
Europe would be the imperial judge of the success
or otherwise of the exercise. We trust that the
temptation to accept such an analysis has been
effectively resisted. This is particularly important
considering the seeming endorsement given to such
gloomy prophesies by the EU's decision to abandon
Article 8 dialogue just as it was about to begin,
in promising circumstances.
We, likewise, trust that another temptation,
namely that of rushing to achieve nothing at whatever
cost, has also been resisted in favour of the
comprehensive, balanced and deep dialogue leading
to commitments on both sides that the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement requires. In the same manner
in which you will be apprising the membership
of the EU on progress, we shall be keeping the
ACP, the AU and the SADC abreast of developments,
and soliciting guidance as necessary.
What are the results we want from our dialogue?
I am sure that, in summing them up, I am indulging
in tautology, as the list was reflected in the
outcome of the officials' frame-work exercise,
when we were preparing for dialogue under Article
8. However, it will not hurt us to say again that
what we expect from the dialogue is as follows:
- A reaffirmation that the partnership between
the EU and Zimbabwe should express itself through
mutual respect, equality and closer co-operation
in areas such as trade, investment and aid in
order to achieve solutions to the jointly recognised
challenges between Zimbabwe and the EU and mobilise
support for Zimbabwe's development programmes.
- A deeper appreciation by the EU of the political,
economic and social imperatives of land reform
and the defining of a constructive role for
the EU in its implementation. The dialogue should
also help to remove the difficulties in relations
between Zimbabwe and Britain, and especially
seek ways by which the British can recognise
and support Zimbabwe's democratic government
and its elected Head of State and provide funds
for compensation and resettlement of landless
people in fulfilment of historical obligations
- The unimpeded growth of democracy in Zimbabwe
on the basis of internationally accepted principles
with due regard given to Zimbabwe's historical,
social and cultural circumstances.
- The creation of conditions for deeper co-operation
between Zimbabwe and the EU in the economic
development of Zimbabwe and the promotion by
this means of a mutually beneficial partnership
in trade and investment. In the same vein, the
dialogue should lead to greater inflows of
investment from the EU, reduce undue conditionalities
and establish a win-win relationship in economic
co-operation.
- The emergence of a set of positive and replicable
precedents for future dialogue between members
of the ACP Group and the EU, and between members
of the North-South partnership in general.
- An acceleration of the momentum of President
Obasanjo's initiative to restore cooperation
between Britain and Zimbabwe on the basis of
the provision by Britain of significant financial
assistance for Zimbabwe's Land Reform and Resettlement
Programme.
In addition, in the interest of promoting the
partnership between the EU and Zimbabwe the present
informal sanctions imposed by a number of EU countries
through the cutting off of aid, support of opposition
parties and issuing of threats against Zimbabwe
must cease.
On this basis, let our dialogue begin in earnest.
On our part, we are ready to engage our partners
of the EU, as well as elucidate our own very real
concerns. In the true spirit of Partnership, we
must tackle all these concerns fully and frankly.
I thank you.